A company’s cyber security no longer depends solely on protecting its own systems. Cloud providers, software houses, IT support companies, digital platforms and other suppliers can access company data, infrastructure and processes and, as a result, become a potential entry point for a cyber attack.
It is on this premise that the NIS2 Directive (hinc, โthe Directiveโ) has given particular importance to the cybersecurity of the supply chain, requiring the organisations concerned to consider also the risks arising from relationships with suppliers and service providers.
In Italy, the principle has been transposed by Legislative Decree No. 138 of 4 September 2024: supply chain security is expressly included among the risk management measures that essential and important entities must adopt.
The consequence is also significant in contractual terms: cybersecurity compliance must be expressly provided for through specific clauses in contractual dealings with suppliers.
NIS2 Directive and the supply chain: why the supplier becomes a risk to be managed
Article 24 of Legislative Decree 138/2024 requires essential and important entities to adopt technical, operational and organisational measures that are appropriate and proportionate to the management of cybersecurity risks.
These expressly include supply chain security, including security-related aspects of relationships with direct suppliers and service providers.
Protecting one’s own corporate perimeter is therefore not enough. It is also necessary to assess suppliers’ specific vulnerabilities, the quality of the products and services used and the cybersecurity practices adopted by technology partners. The contract thus becomes one of the tools through which to govern cyber risk originating from outside.
1. Due diligence: cybersecurity must be verified before the contract
The first safeguard should come before signing.
The selection of a supplier, especially one that may have access to critical systems, data or company infrastructure, should not be based solely on price, quality and continuity of service.
Due diligence on the supplier should verify, in proportion to the criticality of the service, the security procedures adopted, how vulnerabilities and incidents are managed, any certifications, secure software development procedures and the use of subcontractors.
For the most critical suppliers, it may be advisable to provide for security questionnaires, the acquisition of certifications or audit reports and a preliminary risk classification.
The aim is to be able to demonstrate that the supplier was selected through a reasonable, documented process consistent with the level of risk.
2. Minimum cybersecurity requirements
The contract should identify with sufficient precision the security standards the supplier is required to meet.
Generic wording such as โthe supplier guarantees adequate levels of securityโ may in fact prove of little use when it must be established whether or not there has been a breach of contract.
Depending on the service, requirements may be set for access management, multi-factor authentication, encryption, patch management, backup, business continuity, vulnerability management, segregation of environments and staff training.
Requirements must, of course, be calibrated to the actual risk: a provider that manages essential infrastructure requires different safeguards from a supplier with no access to the company’s information systems.
3. Service Level Agreements (hinc, โSLAsโ): not just service availability
SLAs are traditionally used to set service availability, performance and recovery times.
In a contract consistent with a modern cybersecurity strategy, however, SLAs can take on a further function. For example, maximum timeframes for handling vulnerabilities, applying patches, taking charge of incidents, restoring systems and reporting anomalies. In this way, a technical requirement is turned into a contractually measurable obligation, making it easier to verify that it has been fulfilled.
4. Incident notification obligations
One of the most important clauses concerns the reporting of incidents.
A company subject to the Directive may be required to comply with specific obligations to notify the competent authorities. If the incident originates at a supplier, information received too late can make it much more difficult to meet those obligations.
For this reason, the contract should require the supplier to report without undue delay any incidents that may affect the security of the organisation’s systems.
The clause should also establish what information must be transmitted, through which channels, to which contacts and with what subsequent updates.
It is therefore not enough to require the supplier to โreport the data breachโ: the obligation should extend more broadly to relevant cyber incidents, even when they do not necessarily involve a personal data breach.
5. Audits and checks on the supplier
Cybersecurity compliance cannot end with the signing of the contract.
It must be possible to verify over time that the security conditions declared by the supplier continue to be met.
This is why audit clauses are important: they can grant the company the right to carry out checks directly or through third parties, or to obtain periodic audit reports, certifications and other documentation capable of demonstrating that the agreed requirements continue to be met.
Here too, a principle of proportionality should be adopted, avoiding overly invasive procedures for low-risk suppliers and providing for stricter controls on strategic ones.
6. Subcontracting: controlling โcascadeโ risk too
One of the most delicate issues in the cybersecurity supply chain concerns subcontracting.
A business may in fact have carefully selected its direct supplier, but the latter may entrust part of the work to further parties on which the client has carried out no checks at all.
The contract should therefore expressly govern the use of subcontractors, setting out when it is permitted, what information must be disclosed to the client and which cybersecurity requirements must be met.
A cornerstone principle is that of flow-down in contracts: the security obligations imposed on the main supplier must also be passed on, insofar as applicable, to the subcontractors involved in delivering the service. This reduces the risk of security standards weakening further down the supply chain.
7. Vulnerabilities, updates and patches
Software that is secure on delivery can become vulnerable a few months later.
For this reason, the contract should also govern the security lifecycle of the product or service.
It is advisable to establish who must monitor vulnerabilities, within what time frames they must be fixed, for how long security updates must be guaranteed and how the client must be informed of relevant vulnerabilities. For the most critical services and products, specific obligations to cooperate in managing vulnerabilities and incidents may also be provided for.
8. Contractual liability and consequences of non-performance
Finally, cybersecurity obligations must be accompanied by a coherent system of contractual liability. The contract should make clear the consequences of breaching the security standards, the SLAs or the notification and cooperation obligations.
Depending on the relationship, remedies may include remediation obligations, penalties, compensation for damages, suspension of the service or, in the most serious cases, termination of the contract.
Limitation of liability clauses require particular attention: an excessively broad limitation could shift onto the client a significant share of the economic risk arising from an incident attributable to the supplier.
9. What happens at the end of the contract
When the relationship ends, it must be established how data, credentials and information are to be returned or deleted, how access is to be revoked and which cooperation obligations remain in force during migration to a new supplier.
It is an often underestimated yet crucial aspect of relationships with cloud providers, software houses and suppliers that manage strategic infrastructure or information.
From technical cybersecurity to contractual cybersecurity
The Directive consolidates a shift already under way: cybersecurity is no longer simply a matter left to the IT department.
Risk management involves governance, procurement, the legal department, compliance and technical functions. The contract with the supplier becomes one of the points of connection between these areas of expertise.
The logic is simple: if part of a business’s digital infrastructure depends on external parties, security obligations must also extend along the supply chain. For organisations within the scope of the Directive, it therefore becomes advisable to map critical suppliers, classify them by risk and review existing contracts, introducing clauses proportionate to the importance of the services provided.
In other words, cybersecurity compliance no longer ends at the company’s boundaries: it extends along the entire chain of parties on which data, systems and operational continuity depend.

