Cybercrime

Bank phishing: the most common scams and how to protect yourself

Bank phishing uses text messages, phone calls and fake bank alerts to steal credentials or persuade victims to authorise a payment. Here is how to recognise these scams and what to do.

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Banking phishing is a scam in which the criminal poses as your bank, or as your card network, to get you to hand over your access codes or, increasingly, to persuade you to authorise a payment yourself. 

Today it arrives mainly through text messages that appear in the same thread as the bank’s, and calls from numbers that look like the official ones. But don’t worry: the rule for recognising this kind of cyber scam is simple. No bank would ever ask you for codes, PINs or to move money to another account.

We explain this in more detail in this article. 

What bank phishing is and why it differs from other kinds

The basic mechanism is the same as in any phishing attack, which we explained in our guide on how phishing works: a credible sender, an urgent pretext, an action by the victim. 

Bank phishing, however, has a different aim. Stealing the online banking password is no longer enough, because every payment now requires a second confirmation on the customer’s phone. That is why the scam aims to obtain exactly that confirmation: a code, an approval in the app, a transfer made by the victims themselves, convinced they are keeping their money safe.

The Banca d’Italia figures confirm this. In its Report on fraudulent payment transactions in Italy for the second half of 2025, published in July 2026, the overall fraud rate is low, at around 3 euros for every 100,000 transacted. But in bank transfers the prevailing form of fraud is so-called payer manipulation, that is, deception that leads the customer to make a payment voluntarily to the fraudster’s account. Instant transfers remain the most targeted instrument, with 28 euros of fraud for every 100,000 transacted, albeit sharply down from 45 in the previous half-year.

For victims of the scam, however, another figure matters most: when it is the customer who authorises the payment, recovering the money becomes much harder. According to the same report, with fraudulent bank transfers most of the losses are borne by customers.

Fake Intesa Sanpaolo message used in a bank phishing campaign
A phishing campaign themed around Intesa Sanpaolo uses seemingly official communications to push victims towards a fake security procedure and steal their credentials and payment data.

The most common banking scams today

Banking scams change their pretext constantly, but they follow a few recurring patterns. Recognising the pattern is more useful than memorising individual messages, which change every week. Scams in the name of Poste Italiane follow the same mechanisms.

The text message that appears in the bank’s chat

The message arrives in the same conversation thread as the genuine alerts from your bank, under the same sender name. This is the effect of SMS sender spoofing, which allows the number to be replaced with any name. The text reports an unusual login, a suspended payment or the need to “verify your details”, and contains a link to a page identical to your online banking page. Messages of this kind circulate regularly in the name of the major banks, from Intesa Sanpaolo to Banca Sella.

The fact that the SMS appears in the official message thread proves nothing: on the contrary, that is precisely what makes it credible. 

The fake card payment alert

A text message or e-mail in the name of the card network or issuer, for example Nexi, reports that a large payment has just been authorised and urges you to call a number or click a link “if you didn’t make it”. The fear of losing that sum pushes you to react immediately. On the other end, a fake operator, on the pretext of cancelling the transaction, asks for your card details or a confirmation code.

Phishing page imitating the Italian Government and asking users to select their bank
In this campaign documented by CERT-AGID, a fake page with official-looking graphics asked the victim to select their bank, then redirected them to a counterfeit online banking portal.

The call from the bank’s number and the “safe account”

This is the most insidious pattern, because it exploits trust in the anti-fraud service itself. The phone displays the bank’s customer service number, faked through caller ID spoofing. The caller introduces themselves as an operator from the anti-fraud department, sometimes after a text message that “announces” the call, and already knows your name, your bank and sometimes your latest transactions. They explain that the account is under attack and that the only way to save the money is to transfer it immediately to a “safe” or “holding” account. The transfer, often instant and therefore irrevocable, is made by the victim.

Some variants add a second character: a fake Carabinieri officer or police official who “confirms” the investigation under way and makes the story even more credible.

The code or notification “to cancel the transaction”

In many calls the fake operator asks the victim to read out the code just received by SMS, or to approve a notification in the app, “to block the suspicious payment”. 

In reality, that code or notification is used to authorise a payment, add a new device to the account or link the card to a digital wallet controlled by the fraudster. The text of the bank’s message, if read carefully, usually states exactly what the code is for: it is the line the fraudster hopes you will not read.

Fake online banking login pages created to steal banking credentials
Phishing sites can reproduce banks’ login pages very convincingly. The aim is to harvest customer codes, passwords and other data needed to carry the fraud forward.

The remote support app and the fake bank app

In the more elaborate variants, the victim is persuaded to install a remote support app, such as AnyDesk or TeamViewer, “to solve the problem together”, or a fake bank app downloaded from a link. From that moment on, the fraudster can see the screen, read text messages and operate directly on the phone.

Why these scams work even with strong authentication

Since 2019 European banks have applied strong customer authentication, as required by the PSD2 directive: accessing your account or making a payment requires two different elements, such as your password and the phone that receives the code or notification. According to the Banca d’Italia, payments protected by strong authentication carry far lower levels of risk than those without it.

Strong authentication, however, protects against a thief who has only the password, not against a person persuaded to use their own phone to authorise the transaction. Modern bank phishing has adapted to exactly this: it no longer tries to bypass the second factor, but gets the victim to hand it over. That is why the defence is not only technical, but rests on a few rules that always apply.

What a bank never asks you

A bank or card issuer never asks you:

×

di comunicare via telefono, SMS, email o chat password, PIN, codici OTP o i numeri completi della carta;

×

di approvare una notifica nell’app o leggere un codice “per annullare” o “bloccare” un’operazione;

×

di trasferire denaro su un “conto sicuro”, “di appoggio” o intestato a un’altra persona per proteggerlo;

×

di installare un’app di assistenza remota o un’app scaricata da un link;

×

di agire entro pochi minuti, pena il blocco del conto.

If even one of these requests appears in a message or phone call, nothing more is needed to know it is a scam, whatever the sender’s number or name.

How to verify a message or call from your bank

The safest way to verify is never to use the channel through which the contact arrived.

  1. End the conversation. Hang up or close the message, even if the other party insists that “there’s no time”.
  2. Call the bank back yourself on the number on the back of your card, in the official app or on the website typed in by hand. If the call was genuine, the operator will confirm it.
  3. Check the official app to see whether there really are any alerts, blocks or suspended payments: important communications always appear there too.
  4. Read text messages containing codes in full. They state which transaction they refer to and almost always warn you not to share them with anyone.
  5. Use Verification of Payee. Since 9 October 2025, for SEPA transfers the bank checks whether the name entered matches the holder of the IBAN and flags any discrepancies before the payment is sent. According to the Banca d’Italia, this change, together with the new European rules on instant transfers, has helped reduce fraud on these payments. A mismatch warning should never be ignored, especially if someone on the phone is telling you to go ahead anyway.

Banking phishing in business: online banking and supplier payments

For a business, the risk is not limited to the owner’s account. Anyone who can make bank transfers, from the accounts department to the purchasing manager, is a target, and a single payment can be worth far more than anything that moves through a personal account. On top of the techniques above comes the request to change a supplier’s IBAN, the core of BEC and spear phishing fraud.

The measures that reduce risk the most are organisational, even before they are technical:

  • Dual authorisation for transfers above a set threshold, with two different people initiating and approving.
  • Operating limits, daily and per transaction, set on the company’s online banking and in line with actual payments.
  • Out-of-band verification of every IBAN change, with a call to a supplier number already on file, never to the one given in the request.
  • Personal, named user accounts for everyone who accesses online banking, with no shared credentials, and immediate revocation when someone changes role or leaves the company.
  • A written, shared rule: no urgent payment is made simply because a phone call, chat or e-mail asks for it, even if it appears to come from the bank or from the company’s top management.

If you have already fallen for the scam

If you have shared a code, authorised a payment or made a bank transfer, call your bank immediately on its official number and ask for your cards, access and pending transactions to be blocked. Then follow, in order, the steps on what to do immediately after a phishing attack, which include preserving evidence and reporting it to the police.

In many cases the bank is required to refund unauthorised transactions, but not always: a great deal depends on how the fraud took place and on how far the customer could have recognised it. 

Domande frequenti

How can you recognise a bank phishing attempt?

A banking phishing attempt almost always asks you to take urgent action: share an OTP code, approve a notification, click a link, install an app or transfer money. The safest way to verify is to break off contact and call the bank back using only the number shown in the official app, on the website typed in manually or on the back of your card.

Can a bank ask you to move money to a safe account?

No. A bank does not ask customers to transfer money to a “safe account”, “holding account” or an account in another person's name to protect their funds. This request is one of the typical patterns of fraud based on manipulating the payer.

What should I do if I authorised a payment after a banking scam?

You must contact the bank immediately through its official channels, ask it to block access, cards and any transactions that can still be recovered, and keep messages, numbers, receipts and screenshots. Acting at once is important because, when the payment has been authorised by the victim, recovering the funds can be more difficult.

Fonti e riferimenti
  1. Banca d’Italia, Rapporto sulle operazioni di pagamento fraudolente in Italia – II semestre 2025
  2. Banca d’Italia, Truffe: come difendersi
  3. CERT-AgID, Caselle PEC sempre più usate nel phishing per le frodi bancarie
  4. CERT-AgID, In atto una campagna di phishing che sfrutta le insegne del Governo per sottrarre dati bancari
  5. CERT-AgID, Report riepilogativo sulle tendenze delle campagne malevole analizzate dal CERT-AGID nel 2025
  6. European Banking Authority, Joint EBA-ECB report on payment fraud: strong authentication remains effective but fraudsters are adapting
  7. EUR-Lex, Regolamento (UE) 2024/886 sui bonifici istantanei in euro
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