The new race for defence, data centres and infrastructure: who gains, who loses

In 2025 the STOXX Europe Targeted Defence gained 92.7%. As of 31 July 2026, the three-year return had reached 263.5%, while the twelve-month figure had cooled to 7.9%. These numbers tell of a re-rating built mainly in previous years, followed by a phase in which the market began to distinguish more sharply between expectations and results.

The industrial momentum, however, continues. In 2025 defence investment by EU Member States grew by 23%, reaching €134 billion; for 2026, war or no war, the Council of the EU forecasts almost €163 billion. Compared with 2021, the projected increase is 158.7%.

The picture is set to last. At the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, the Allies committed to allocating 5% of GDP to defence and security by 2035: at least 3.5% to core military requirements and up to 1.5% to critical infrastructure, resilience, networks, innovation and other related items (NATO).

For those governing an organisation with interests in European industry, this reallocation implies a shift in investment priorities that could soon affect procurement, capital, skills and competitive positions. This is exactly what a Due Intelligence reads across industrial, financial, reputational and governance signals, before the decision arrives as an emergency.

From these figures, three useful questions emerge for boards: which parts of the new spending can we realistically capture? Which resources are becoming scarcer because new programmes are competing for them? And has our organisation chosen its relationship with the defence supply chain, or is it letting one emerge through inertia?

Let’s find an answer together.

The Italian plan shows how much wider the supply chain is than weapons

The Multi-year Defence Planning Document 2025-2027, as analysed by the Research Services of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, spreads investment over a horizon extending to 2039. Among the largest items are 46.6 billion for aircraft, 15.3 billion for remotely piloted capabilities, 15.4 billion for weapons and ammunition, 5.9 billion for digitalisation and info-structure, and 9.1 billion for infrastructure assets. The parliamentary dossier lists programmes and funding sources in detail.

These amounts should not be added up as if they were a single new allocation: they cover different programmes, different sources and multi-year horizons. They are, however, useful for understanding where industrial demand is widening.

The thesis that emerges is clear: those capturing this spending are not the same as those producing traditional weapons systems. A growing share of value is shifting towards secure cloud, computing capacity, cybersecurity, sensors, communications networks, drones, energy, specialised construction, maintenance and logistics.

Who gains: three tiers of the new supply chain

1. Direct manufacturers

Leonardo, Rheinmetall, BAE Systems, Thales, Airbus Defence, KNDS and the other major prime contractors remain the most visible tier. They produce platforms, systems, munitions and integrated capabilities. Much of the market has already re-rated their prospects, so the question today increasingly concerns their ability to convert backlog, production and investment into sustainable results.

2. Digital dual-use

This is the most relevant tier for many civilian companies. Italy’s DPP allocates €5.9 billion up to 2039 to digitalisation and infostructure, with a data-centric approach covering cloud, artificial intelligence, advanced connectivity and cybersecurity. The programme is described in the parliamentary dossier.

This tier includes operators in cybersecurity, cloud infrastructure and data centres, electronic components, networks, software, sensors and high-reliability services. Access to the programmes requires technical credentials, security, operational continuity, procurement and institutional relations far more structured than in an ordinary B2B market.

For companies already increasing investment in AI, cloud and computing capacity, the question also concerns governance: which infrastructure has civilian use, which could become dual-use, and what constraints does it introduce? AI Governance becomes relevant when technology, costs, data and accountability begin to overlap.

3. Physical and energy infrastructure

Barracks, ports, air bases, energy systems, microgrids, storage, telecommunications and maintenance works extend the supply chain into construction, energy and technical services. In Italy’s DPP, infrastructure assets receive €9.1 billion up to 2039, explicitly linked to greater energy and digital efficiency.

It is a less spectacular part of European rearmament, yet it may become one of the most stable, because it concerns capabilities that must function every day and that require maintenance, upgrading and continuity.

Who bears the opportunity cost

Every public reallocation on this scale carries an opportunity cost. That cost does not automatically equal a flat cut to other sectors: it can be absorbed through new debt, higher taxation, budget shifts or growth in overall spending. For a company, however, the resources actually being contested are often more tangible than the state budget.

The first is talent. Cybersecurity, AI, space, electronics, data engineering and telecommunications are already scarce skills. Stronger demand from the defence supply chain can push up salaries, recruiting times and retention difficulties for civilian companies too.

The second is industrial capacity. Shipyards, components, specialty materials, semiconductors, energy and certified suppliers can become bottlenecks when several programmes scale up at the same time.

The third is institutional attention. Complex programmes absorb administrative capacity, procurement, permits and political priorities. Those operating in civil infrastructure, the energy transition or innovation may find themselves competing for the same public expertise and for part of the same delivery capacity.

This redistribution is a map. It shows where constraints are tightening and which decisions deserve to be brought forward.

The decisions a board should take now

Entering the defence supply chain takes time. Certifications, security clearance, standards, procurement, track record and institutional relationships cannot be built once the tender is already open. At the same time, entering dual-use can change clients, reputation, partnerships and the ability to attract certain categories of talent.

Three questions therefore deserve a place on the agenda: which of the company’s capabilities are already compatible with defence or dual-use demand? What investment would be needed to genuinely access that market? What impact would the choice have on brand, stakeholders and future strategic freedom?

Competitive Intelligence can help track who is entering, which partnerships are forming and where skills and production capacity are shifting. The final decision, however, remains a portfolio and governance decision, because it sets a boundary the company will have to maintain over time.