Markets, jobs and prospects: how a war with Russia would change everything

We would rather never have to address this subject.
And perhaps, as we hope, it will prove unnecessary (we truly hope so).
When you hold a certain position, however, looking ahead and projecting forward can and must be a strategic necessity. So this article starts from a specific scenario: a direct conflict between Russia and NATO in Europe, and the economic consequences it would have for companies, markets and the world of work.

The starting point has become more concrete in recent weeks.
On 1 September 2026 the German government blamed Russia for the attempted attack using an explosives-laden drone on a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle airport. Berlin announced countermeasures, including the closure of the Russian consulate in Bonn (Reuters).

In the same period, sources cited by Reuters confirmed that CIA Director John Ratcliffe had raised concerns with Moscow about a possible Russian operation against a NATO country. Ratcliffe’s visit and the American concerns were reported at the end of August.

To be clear, this does not mean that war is close. A senior NATO official stated on 30 August that the Alliance sees no imminent threat of a direct attack. Finnish President Alexander Stubb has offered a similar assessment. The scenario therefore remains hypothetical.

You do not need tanks at the gates, however, to ask what would happen if war were not just a distant scenario. And for a board, this question can help clarify how exposed its own organisation is, and in which sectors.

Let’s explore this scenario together.

The first impact would come from the markets

A military escalation on NATO territory would first of all increase uncertainty. The exact reactions would depend on the nature of the attack, the Alliance’s response and the duration of the crisis, so we cannot be too precise (fortunately). Yet it is clear that the first consequence for businesses would be a higher cost of risk.

The market would tend to rapidly reprice assets exposed to the region, financial stocks, energy-intensive companies and businesses with supply chains concentrated in Eastern Europe. For some companies the problem would show up in the cost of capital; for others in insurance, credit, demand and supplier availability.

The defence sector has already undergone a sharp revaluation in recent years. As at 31 July 2026, the STOXX Europe Targeted Defence showed growth of 263.5% over three years (STOXX). This means markets have already priced in part of the increase in European military spending. A direct conflict, however, would shift attention from industrial policy to the continuity of the entire economic system.

Energy would return to the centre of the income statement

Since 2022 Europe has drastically reduced its dependence on Russian gas. In 2025 Russia’s share of EU gas imports had fallen to 12%, from 45% in 2021. Meanwhile, LNG, regasification capacity, storage and supplier diversification have all increased (European Commission).

This new structure makes the system more resilient, yet keeps energy among the variables most sensitive to a wider conflict. Pipelines, power grids, LNG terminals, cables and transport infrastructure are physical assets. In a military scenario or one of widespread sabotage, the security of these networks would feed directly into the cost of energy and the continuity of production.

The ECB has already shown how far an external conflict can spread through energy. In the scenario published in May 2026, built around the energy shock linked to the war in the Middle East, oil reached 145 dollars a barrel and gas 106 euro/MWh in the second quarter of 2026. Cumulative inflation was 6.3 percentage points higher up to 2028 than in the December projections.

For an energy-intensive company, then, the test is whether the business plan holds up under persistently higher energy prices, harder access to hedging and higher transport and insurance costs.

The European supply chain would change its geography and timescales

Over recent decades Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary have become part of many European production chains, from automotive to industrial components. Rising tension on NATO’s eastern flank would have consequences even without turning these areas into theatres of combat.

The Centro Studi Confindustria is already treating supply chain resilience as an economic security issue. In its work on critical raw materials, diversifying sources and reducing single points of failure are seen as strategic priorities in a context of growing geopolitical fragmentation.

Corporate preparedness therefore starts with a simple map: which suppliers, plants, warehouses and routes become critical if a border slows down or a piece of infrastructure becomes temporarily unavailable? The second question concerns how long it would take to activate an alternative.

Work would become a matter of operational continuity

Companies with people on the eastern flank would face a level of complexity that standard HR plans only partly cover. Mobility, security, remote working, data access, evacuation, temporary replacement of key roles and internal communication would become operational decisions to be taken within hours.

This also applies to companies with no direct presence in the region. A strategic supplier may depend on local staff, an IT function may be spread across several countries, and a logistics hub may serve markets far removed from where the disruption begins.

The useful approach is to prepare procedures that make clear who can halt an operation, who authorises a relocation, how data is handled, which people must be contacted and which external services are already available.

Three questions a board can put on the agenda now

So, in light of all this, what can be done to be prepared for any scenario?

There is some good news: preparation can begin without drawing up a war plan. It is enough to bring three questions to the table and ask for verifiable answers.

1. Where are we exposed? Supply chain, customers, staff, infrastructure, contracts, banks, insurers and critical suppliers need to be mapped geographically. A map that ignores second-tier dependencies risks underestimating the problem.
2. How robust is the financial plan? Energy, transport, interest rates, credit, demand and CAPEX should be stress-tested against scenarios more severe than those used in the ordinary budget.
3. Who decides in the first 72 hours? Business continuity and crisis management work best when authority, escalation, contacts and alternatives have already been clarified.

The quality of the exercise depends on the ability to distinguish between scenario, probability and exposure. Preparing for a war that may never come makes sense only if the work builds greater resilience against less extreme shocks as well: sabotage, energy disruption, logistics problems or financial strain.

No board, of course, is being asked to predict the next conflict. It is enough to know which decisions would suddenly become irreversible if the context changed faster than the company.
That said, we hope this scenario never comes to pass.